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A B S T R A C T
This paper addresses the evolution of maritime transport demand in response to global climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The complexity of the global
shipping system makes predicting volumes and patterns of long-term future international maritime trade a challenging task which is best explored by building
scenarios rather than ‘precise’ forecasts. We present four contrasting scenarios of international maritime trade out to 2050, available in high resolution in terms of the
dimensions studied (regions, countries, commodities, decades), which are consistent with high and low levels of global CO2 mitigation and associated climate
impacts. The scenarios project trade increasing to between two and four times the 2010 value by 2050. Scenarios characterised by low temperature increases and
material intensity lead to the lower bound trade increase with high trade growth in bioenergy commodities. Unfettered production growth across countries, high
temperature increases and material intensity lead to a quadrupling of trade across energy, containerised, dry and wet commodities. The estimated range is lower than
those in existing scenarios and forecasts in which globalisation is assumed to continue apace. The scenarios which project the highest growth presupposes both
limited decarbonisation (in contrast to the Paris Agreement) and continued growth in expanding markets. The scenarios therefore become a valuable policy and
decision-making tool to address technological and operational change required of the shipping sector, if it is to deliver mitigation in line with the Paris Agreement.
1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement sets the goal of limiting global warming to well
below 2 °C, and ideally to below 1.5 °C and “[i]n order to achieve the long-
term temperature goal […] Parties aim to reach global peaking of green-
house gas emissions as soon as possible”, followed by “rapid reductions
thereafter” [1]. While the Agreement was unanimously adopted by the
parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention,
the main emitters not explicitly included in the agreement are not coun-
tries, but the international aviation and shipping sectors. In article 2.2 of
the Kyoto Protocol, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is
charged with regulating greenhouse gas emissions from international
shipping, but no legally binding targets on sectoral emissions have been
agreed [2]. In October 2016, at the 72nd meeting of its Marine Environ-
ment Protection Committee (MEPC), the IMO produced a draft roadmap
towards the adoption of an “IMO Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions
from ships” [3]. This roadmap was further built upon in 2018 at MEPC 72
wherein it sets a GHG emission reduction pathway of “at least” 50% on
2008 levels by 2050 with a clear aspiration on full decarbonisation by
100% by 2050 if possible (MEPC, [49]).
Both agreements inter alia make reference to the maritime in-
dustry's need to reduce levels of emissions and develop abatement op-
portunities that contribute to meeting long-term temperature goals. In
order to do so, public and private stakeholders engaged in setting
marine policy or scoping future investment decisions in adopting green
maritime technology need to incorporate expectations about the future
demand for maritime transport. Specifically, how might the demand for
maritime transport evolve until 2050 when efforts to mitigate and
adapt to climate change are endogenised within national production
industries? In such a context how might varying socio-economic
framings such as population change, material intensity, technological
advances and economic growth further influence the demand for mar-
itime transport?
This paper addresses the aforementioned challenges by presenting
four scenarios of global maritime trade until 2050, each exploring a
contrasting climate change figure consistent with high and low levels of
global CO2 mitigation and associated climate impacts. The outcome is a
matrix of goods quantities transported by sea for each future decade
between 16 regions of the world according to a particular scenario,
which can be further broken down at the region, country, commodity or
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decade levels for in depth examination of future trade flows. This novel
tool improves our understanding of the plausible evolution of shipping
by removing some of the uncertainty associated with predictions of
maritime trade flows which is replaced by informed impacts attributed
to the scenario narratives. Concurrently it could i) enhance policy ef-
forts concerning the maritime sector's actions to mitigate GHG emis-
sions; ii) augment shipowners' and shipmanagers' investment decisions,
be it current or future, binding or not, for greener ships and technolo-
gies.
The paper is structured as follows: The remainder of Section 1
surveys the literature concerning projections of maritime trade, and
defines our aims, scope and methodological context. Section 2 sum-
marises the scenario narratives and presents our methodology. Section
3 presents and discusses the derived trade scenarios. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 4.
1.1. International trade and the demand for sea transport, present and
future
Over 80% of global trade by volume and more than 70% of global
trade by value is transported by sea [4]. These are carried by ap-
proximately 94% of the world fleet of ships1, while the remainder is
occupied with the transport of passengers and other functions [5].
From the 1950s until the mid-2000s, international trade has grown
at a rate of 5.9% p. a. and trade relative to economic output more than
tripled [6,7]. During this period total shipping emissions rose to around
950 million tonnes of CO2 and of CO2e of GHGs in 2012 [8], emissions
of the same order as those of Germany [9], or the aviation sector [10].
The evolution of shipping demand is inexorably linked to the
growth of world trade, and it is inherently difficult to predict in the long
term due to diverse influencing factors and their interlinkages [11]. As
shipping is a derived demand, the demand for shipping services de-
pends on transportation drivers in addition to economic growth and the
pattern of trade. Production and demand for individual commodities
evolve, leading to the emergence of new commodities and centres of
production, while others disappear. In such a context, technological
advances in the maritime sector alter the costs of transport, and their
relative importance vis-a-vis other trade barriers is also subject to un-
certain change. Because of such complexity and inherent uncertainty
regarding the evolution of future maritime transport demand, pre-
dicting long-term sectoral CO2 emissions is arguably infeasible. How-
ever, to facilitate the decision-making process of the policy debate
concerning the decarbonisation of the shipping sector, scenarios of fu-
ture shipping trade are a useful tool. This paper presents the outcomes
of four such scenarios with the intention to scope the range, extent, and
timing of technological and operational change required for dec-
arbonisation.
A common approach for exploring the future under conditions of
complexity and uncertainty is by developing a set of contrasting,
plausible scenarios. Scenario studies provide a structured approach for
comparing hypothetical futures and have been used across many areas.
For instance, Hubert et al. [12]; and Alexandratos and Bruinsma [13]
produced global food scenarios up to the year 2050, exploring the
impact of population, GDP, changing diets, and yields on consumption
and production of agricultural commodities.
Dinwoodie et al. [14] ran a Delphi study with maritime specialists to
gauge expectations of future oil trade, haul lengths, and demand for oil
tankers. The results suggest that dramatic policies (such as reductions in
oil imports) will be needed if emission reduction commitments are to be
met. As the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is a key driver for
climate change impacts, carbon budgets are used in Anderson and Bows
[50] to establish decadal emission reduction targets for the sector, de-
monstrating the need for significant (> 85%) decarbonisation by 2050
if shipping is to make a proportional contribution limiting global mean
temperature increase to 2 °C. Skeie et al. [15] employed a more
common approach, producing transport scenarios based on indicator
variables from existing suites of scenarios, in their case the SRES sce-
narios [16], with the aim of quantifying the future temperature re-
sponse due to emissions from shipping (and other transport sectors).
Fontagné and Fouré [17] project trade until 2035 using a model of
the global economy where in the first instance observed elasticities of
trade to income are reproduced. Scenarios are projected based on
modifications to the underlying drivers such as national level economic
growth, demographics, and trade policies. Whilst there is no explicit
carbon budget used to consider the impact of climate change, changes
in energy intensity of GDP and other efficiency gains are included.
Global trade in goods is projected to grow 1.3–4.3 times by 2035. In a
related study, Château et al. [18] adopt a similar method focusing on a
longer-term perspective out to 2060, with scenarios reflecting different
degrees of trade liberalisation, i.e. regionalisation vs. multilateralism,
which are manifested in respective annual increases of 3.6% and 3.8%
in global exports, resulting in trade quadrupling by 2050. Sharmina
et al. [19] converted future energy demand in global decarbonisation
scenarios from the IPCC AR5 database [20] to shipped trade, con-
cluding that fossil fuel trade would decline significantly in a 2 °C world
by 2050, and that the decline would unlikely be compensated by an
increase in the bioenergy trade.
Building on the work of Fontagné and Fouré [17]; Martinez et al.
[21] initially project the value of trade based on identifying future
centres of production and consumption, after which commodity specific
estimates of value-to-weight ratios, modal share, and estimates of trade
route distance are used to express scenarios in terms of global transport
work. Seaborne transport work does not vary significantly between
scenarios, increasing approximately fivefold by 2050. Included in the
scenarios is an estimate of the carbon intensity of transport with
emissions associated with seaborne trade anticipated to increase 3–3.75
times the value for 2010 by 2050.
Beyond the academic literature, Lloyd's Register [22] present three
contrasting scenarios for 2030 based on the impact of key variables
(population, economy, natural resources) on trade. Results are ex-
pressed for four main ship types: dry bulk, crude, other wet bulk, and
containers. By 2030, trade is anticipated to increase to around 1.15–2.8
times the baseline (2010) value depending on ship type and scenario
(cf. Table E.8 of the Appendix). The 3rd IMO GHG study [8] contains
scenarios of maritime transport. It uses GDP as an indicator variable for
unitised and non-coal dry bulk transport work; and coal and oil con-
sumption as indicator variables for coal and oil transport work, re-
spectively. Fitting a curve to historical data and taking projections of
GDP from the shared socio-economic pathways (SSP), and coal and oil
consumption from scenarios associated with the representative con-
centration pathways (RCP), transport work in the four categories is
projected out to 2050. Using the same method, updated projections are
given in Lee [39], adding cargo categories gas and chemicals, and
splitting unitised cargo into containers, and other unitised. Finally,
some industry market outlooks provide projections of future sea trade,
e.g. Ref. [23]. Table D.7 of the Appendices provides a summary over-
view of the main references discussed here. Section 3.5 presents a
quantitative comparison with the scenarios of study.
1.2. Scenarios of international maritime trade: aims & scope
Scenarios are used as a heuristic tool, requiring they are framed in a
manner to capture the aggregated effect of processes and drivers which
may act mutually or counteract given the context. While there have
been some studies exploring future trade, few have aimed to integrate
both qualitative and quantitative methods and regional commodity
specific elements to more meaningfully address an inherently complex
system, where no single investigative approach is likely to be adequate
to address these issues. This is particularly relevant to trade given the1 Measured in deadweight units.
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complexity of numerous competing agents, reinforcing that scenario
results are exploratory alternative futures rather than predictions. This
study developed four scenarios of future maritime trade flows over the
2020–2050 period using 2010 as the base year. Each scenario consists
of a specific set of future climate change and socio-economic develop-
ment hypotheses: the scenarios Green Road (GR), and Middle Road 2 °C
(MR2C) are characterised by 2 °C of global warming whereas in sce-
narios High Road (HR), and Middle Road 4 °C (MR4C) average global
surface temperature increases by 4 °C by the end of the 21st century.
Using Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) scenarios [24]
RCP2.6 (GR and MR2C), and RCP8.5 (MR4C and HR), combined with
Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) scenarios [25], SSP1 (GR), SSP2
(MR2C and MR4C), and SSP5 (HR), we lay down the framework for
examining of future socio-economic outcomes (see Table C.6 of the
Appendices for more detail).
The trade scenarios cover nearly all sea-born traded commodities,2
transported by three main vessel types, dry bulk, wet bulk, and con-
tainers across 16 geographical regions encompassing nearly all coun-
tries of the world (cf. Sections A and B of the Appendices).
In contrast with many existing studies, which apply a single method
across most commodities, the need to capture the complexity of having
different drivers for key commodities with regional specificities means
that no single method or dataset was deemed sufficient in isolation.
Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach is adopted for designing, si-
mulating and deriving each future scenario. Due to the complexity of
interrelations between transportation capacity, production output and
coupled with technological constraints associated with each vessel type,
separate methodologies to derive the quantitative elements of the sce-
narios are applied to three broad categories of goods. Energy com-
modities are projected using the TIAM UCL model; containerised goods'
projections are computed using the correlation between countries'
growth rates of trade, GDP and number and weight of containers con-
taining such goods; the balance of tradeable commodities, namely non-
energy, non-containerised goods are projected using elasticities ob-
tained from econometric estimations.
This procedure allows us i) to isolate and project trade data by
transport mode and commodity type and apply suitable methodologies
to overcome apparent constraints, such as inconsistency in data avail-
ability and coverage across commodities, regions and time periods ii)
tailor our approach to the performance of goods under specific climate
change constraints. For example, scenarios requiring the substitution of
consumption of crude oil by renewable energy invalidate a simple
econometric approach that yields elasticities of traded quantities with
respect to production output. Such an approach cannot capture shocks
associated with the introduction/substitution of renewable sources of
energy in either country, especially when there is no such historical
record/analogue. However, a simulated approach using the TIAM-UCL
model ensures that the substitution between crude oil and renewable
energy consumption does feed into changes to demand for crude oil
between two countries. Section 2 describes the methodologies in more
detail.
Although our study shares some methodological and structural si-
milarities with the aforementioned body of literature, its novelty is
three-fold:
Firstly in the granularity in which trade is projected. Secondly in the
implementation of tailor-made methods to quantify trade flows. Both
climate change impacts and emission mitigation, could affect regional
production potentials for commodities. Thereby, important commodity-
region-specific characteristics and productive constraints are in-
corporated into the scenario analysis. Finally, in the explicit use of an
interdisciplinary methodological framework, including qualitative and
quantitative tools of analysis, to capture the problem's inherent com-
plexity.
Τhe overall outcome is a matrix of traded goods for each future
decade between regions. This matrix can be disaggregated to matrices
at the region, country, commodity, decade levels. We analyse our
findings across several of these dimensions in Section 3.
2. Method
This section presents the methodologies, summarised in Fig. 1, by
which the scenarios were produced. The main outcome variable, the
quantity of each commodity traded by sea, between an origin and
destination pair within a year, is derived using three distinct methods
applied to non-overlapping groups of commodities.3
The process for each scenario comprises a narrative that establishes
a commodity/region specific assumption, which is then integrated into
an estimate for global trade. There are three commodity categories each
consisting of a number of distinct commodities under the ISIC classifi-
cation:4 Energy commodities, containerised commodities and non-en-
ergy, non-containerised commodities.5 Energy commodity projections
for each scenario are computed using the TIAM-UCL model to adhere to
emission budgets and take into account substitution effects between
energy carriers.
For non-energy, non-containerised goods, the elasticities of trade
with respect to output are obtained from estimations of historical data
of trade and regional production of the commodities and are used to
future responses of trade following scenario specific adjustments to
output. Lastly as historical output data in term of weight for many
containerised commodities is unavailable, future container trade is
projected based on observing and modifying the trends in derived
elasticity of trade and GDP across key trade corridors. In the next sec-
tion we present in more detail the scenario narratives and pathways,
and each of the methodologies.
2.1. Scenario narratives and pathways
Each of the scenarios comprises quantitative elements, based on the
underlying SSPs and RCPs, which were articulated within a qualitative
narrative. We developed two scenarios consistent with limiting the
global temperature increase to 2 °C by 2100 (RCP2.6) and two with a
4 °C limit (RCP8.5). The 2 °C scenarios explore a future where sustain-
ability is important (Green Road) and a future similar to today in terms
of governance (Middle Road 2C) framed by SSP1 and SSP2 respectively.
Green Road (GR) in particular envisions a future where regionalisation
remains a potent force. Similarly contrasting futures are explored in the
4 °C scenarios, High Road and Middle Road 4C, where High Road
presents a high-tech world dominated by fossil fuels (SSP5) amid ex-
panding processes of globalisation and increased economic convergence
amongst regions and Middle Road 4C (SSP2) again explores how gov-
ernance priorities and values similar to today's impact upon trade.6
Participatory approaches are valued for empowering stakeholders and
ensuring scenarios are relevant to their needs, as well as enabling the
inclusion a wide range of expert knowledge [26]; [27–29]. Thus,
workshops were used to elicit expert input from industrial,7 academic,
2 We do not study the categories “Manufacture of tobacco products” and
“Mining of uranium and thorium ores” due to data paucity. We do not expect
any non-negligible effects in world maritime trade from omission of these
commodities.
3 Table 4 of the Appendix presents all commodity groups and a summary of
estimation methods applied to them.
4 International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities.
5 Table 4 of the Appendix contains the breakdown of ISIC commodities per
broad commodity category.
6 See O'Neill et al. [25]; Section 1.2, and Section C of the Appendix for more
details.
7 The term “Industrial” in this case refers to companies that are directly in-
volved in maritime sector or closely involved in production of materials for
whom maritime trade is essential, such as energy commodities.
C. Walsh, et al. Marine Policy 106 (2019) 103537
3
and non-governmental stakeholders, and helped define the narrative of
each scenario. Stakeholders were chosen to reflect a diverse range of
opinion, knowledge of the maritime sector, as well as specific com-
modity, region or and trade. Section E in the appendices summarises
the main stakeholder, distinguishing those who provided specific data
sources. In that regard stakeholders play three primary roles, that of
advice and review on the framing and generation of the scenarios, a
broader steering capacity (e.g. beyond just trade scenarios), direct
provision of datasets.
For example, the experts' input informed the choice of climate
constraints, the appropriate SSP/RCP alignment, and the most relevant
SSP sub-elements for trade. The draft trade scenario narratives were
further subjected to a process of stakeholder validation and review, to
ensure that they meet the criteria of relevance, plausibility, consistency,
Fig. 1. Method flowchart.
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creativity, and consistency e.g. whether (or should) related sectors re-
spond in a similar way to climate framing? [30]. The main scenario
characteristics stemming from each narrative are summarised in
Table 1. Table 6 of the Appendix. The projection of seaborne trade of
energy commodities is described in the following section.
2.2. Trade of energy commodities
Projections of trade flows for these commodities are constructed
using the TIAM-UCL global energy system model.8 Whilst the optimi-
sation provides useful insights, it is also a limitation of the approach,
which will be biased towards future technological solutions over short-
term demand-side change [31]. The model can be constrained to a
certain average global surface temperature rise using its climate
module. Some of the quantitative and qualitative elements are direct
inputs, including variables such as GDP, population, energy systems in
place, land availability for bioenergy feedstock production etc. Such
process necessitates assumptions on the point at which key technolo-
gies, such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) becomes viably scal-
able. In GR, bio-energy land is limited to, in units of primary energy
production per year, 350 EJ. In MR2C, a tighter limit of 130 EJ is set (in
line with SSP narratives). For MR4C and HR, characterised by low le-
vels of mitigation, land availability limits do not become relevant. The
resulting energy trade flows are converted from energy units into
tonnes, yielding the projections of inter-regional trade in energy com-
modities in each of the four scenarios. The inputs to the TIAM-UCL
model are summarised in Table 6 of the Appendix. The output of the
TIAM-UCL simulations for each scenario is a bilateral matrix of regional
trade flows of energy commodities expressed in common weight units
or volume, which admit global social welfare maximisation and mini-
misation of the total discounted energy system costs in each time step.
2.3. Trade of non-energy commodities
This section summarises the approach for deriving scenario trade
projections for all commodities not classified as Energy commodities.
Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 describe the method for projecting trade of non-
energy non-containerised commodities using econometric estimation.
Section 2.3.3 describes the method for generation of containerised
commodity projections.
2.3.1. Historic trends in output and future projections
For each non-energy commodity, the historical (1970/80-2010)
output by region measured in tonnes by extracting national level data
expressed in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC) classification and aggregating to the regional
level. Details of production estimates by commodity are summarised in
Table 7 of the Appendix, along with data sources.
We develop regional production models for each commodity to
project future production in tonnes for the period 2020–2050, con-
sistent with trends in historical data. In addition, for each commodity
output projection is framed by the SSPs, RCPs, and stakeholder-
Table 1
Summary of exemplar linkages between climate change and trade.
Climate Measure and Scenario Commodity Bounding Conditions Response by 2050.
Mitigation of emissions in order to minimise
global temperature increase to 2 °C by 2100.
(GR Scenario).
Coal. Domestic production reduced in order to
maintain global CO2 concentrations consistent
with defined climate thresholds and emission
budgets.
Established limits on allowable consumption of
fossil fuels and scale of negative emissions
necessary.
Satisfaction of consumptive energy demand for
domestic heating, transport, industry etc.
Trade estimated by balancing supply and
demand in the most cost effective manner.
By 2050 97% reduction (vs 2010) in use of coal
within electricity generation. 88% reduction in
trade following 80% reduction in production (in
energy terms) and changes in centres of demand
and supply. (e.g. 90% reduction in coal exports
from Australia).
Biomass and Bio-energy
crops.
By 2050 a 6-fold increase in production (in
energy terms vs 2050) following displacement of
coal, emergence of new trading routes especially
African exports post 2030 based on efficient
expansion of under-utilised land.
Mitigation of emissions in order to minimise
global temperature increase to 4 °C by 2100
with low adaptive capacity. (MR4C
Scenario) and response to climate change
impacts.
Net primary production
of crops and livestock
products (excluding
Biomass).
Regional temperature increase by 2050
consistent with 4 °C scenario (approximately
2–3 °C increase relative to 1985–2005
reference by 2050).
Domestic pro duction consistent to meet basic
human requirements. Trade estimated by
balancing supply and demand in the most cost-
effective manner.
Output by 2050 10% higher than to 2010 levels
(excluding biomass). Significant reduction in
output from regions such as Middle East as
yields decrease by >50% based on the regional
temperature increase and high sensitivity of
agriculture due to low adaptive capacity.
Moderate (+10%) increase in production from
regions currently seen as future centres of
production such as Africa. Increasing
dependence on production in regions such as
Canada and former USSR due to expansion of
productive areas. Global average per capita food
(primary crop and livestock equivalents) at 2010
levels. Global trade in 2050 (including biomass)
increases by 70% in response to regional
shortfalls in production.
Mitigation of emissions in order to minimise
global temperature increase to 2 °C by 2100.
(GR Scenario).
Iron Ore. Global energy mix necessary to maintain global
CO2 concentrations consistent with defined
climate thresholds.
Informs the energy consumption allowable for
the steel sector by region and by fuel type.
Satisfaction of demand for domestic steel
products. Trade estimated based on the
elasticity of output with exports.
The reduction of the coal use in the
manufacturing of steel is based on an increase in
the use of electric arc furnaces displacing
traditional integrated steel works. This reflects
an increase in steel recycling and a reduced
demand for primary ore. By 2050 domestic
production decreases by approximately 40% but
trade decreases by a lesser margin
(approximately 10%) as imports must
compensate for a depletion of Chinese domestic
ore reserves.
8 TIAM-UCL is a linear programming cost optimisation model, which mini-
mises total discounted energy system costs and maximises social welfare
(Anandarajah [44]; Anandarajah et al. [45]; Price and Keppo [46], and Raucci,
[47].
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informed scenario narratives; and is constrained by regional limits to
production, such as reserves. For example, ISIC 5 -fisheries- projects
future production based on trends in global population and per capita
fish consumption. A key feature in incorporating commodity specific
elements is ensuring projections of dependent commodities are not
independent of each other, but models for individual commodities are
interlinked to ensure internal consistency within each scenario. For
example, the quantity of metal ore (ISIC 13) produced depends on the
amount of steel output by production technology (ISIC 27). The latter is
linked to the energy consumed by energy carrier and region, by the iron
and steel sector, which itself is an output of the energy scenarios from
the TIAM-UCL model. Fossil fuels that are discrete commodity cate-
gories in their own right, such as ISIC 10 referring to coal and lignite,
are excluded from the table as they are exclusively projected within
TIAM-UCL.
2.3.2. Econometric analysis of non-energy, non-containerised commodities
Quantities of traded commodities, irrespective of mode of transport
are taken from the UN Comtrade database for the period 2000–2010
[32], subsequently translated into estimates of seaborne trade based on
the percentage that is transported by sea.9 For each commodity, the
historical values of bilateral trade and production by commodity and
region form the inputs to the econometric assessments of the elasticity
of trade with respect to output and are used for the final extrapolation
up to 2050 using the starting values contained in the baseline dataset.
We estimate the elasticity of export supply with respect to output using
panel data fixed effects estimation for each exporting region and ISIC
category. We control for variation across destination and underlying
sectors comprising each ISIC category and exploit time variation. Where
estimates could not be obtained due to data paucity or were insignif-
icant, we imputed them with a region or ISIC category average. The
mean elasticity of export supply with respect to output across all re-
gions and ISIC categories stands at 1.73 with a standard deviation of
0.69. Utilising the elasticity of export supply and the future projection
of production output described in 2.3.1, we obtain predicted exports of
each specific region to the rest of the world per year and ISIC com-
modity. Region to region trade is then calculated using the ratios of
bilateral regional to rest of the world exports of the 2010 baseline year.
2.3.3. Containerised commodities
For manufactured commodities that are likely to be shipped in
containers, the techniques applied in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 were not
viable as it was not possible to generate robust estimates of historic
production quantity by region –historical output data, if at all, are
available in numbers of products, but not in weight. Therefore a sepa-
rate approach was developed which treats container trade as a discrete
commodity:
Future projections of Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU) trade
flows are, in the first instance, produced from a dataset, provided by
MSI containing TEU flows along defined corridors such as Inter-Asia,
Asia to Europe etc., between 1995 and 2013 [33]. These data distin-
guish direction and whether the routes reflect main or backhaul trade.
Employing a) country level GDP data associated with each country
along the trade corridor, expressed in 2005 international dollars for
consistency with the SSPs [34], and b) the container trade in TEU along
designated corridors such as Asia to Europe, the historic trend in the
year on year elasticity of the importing region's trade in TEU and GDP
from 1999 to 2010 (Δ TEU/Δ GDP) is obtained. This provides an ac-
count of both the baseline (2010) multiplier of trade and GDP growth as
well as an indication of the direction of regional trends.
Starting from the calculated elasticities, for each trade corridor,
trade elasticities (Δ TEU/Δ GDP) are projected over the period to 2050,
in a scenario-building process aiming to reflect the qualitative scenario
elements (cf. Table 6 of the Appendix). For example, as a reduced
material intensity and regionalisation are manifest features of SSP1, the
GR scenario container trade within key regions (e.g. intra-Asia or inter-
Latin America) is projected to grow at a faster rate than more estab-
lished routes. Alternatively, as HR projects increased material intensity
and increased regional convergence this scenario projects a decrease in
the disparity of trade across established main haul and backhaul routes.
Future trade in TEU along each trade corridor is calculated from
GDP projections of importing regions (as per the underlying SSP sce-
nario and the countries that comprise the regional groupings), and from
the projected elasticity for this trade corridor, including when it reaches
parity and/or< 1 (i.e. trade stagnates). The steps above project trade
across trade corridors not in terms of the 16 study regions used for other
commodities. Therefore, using both the baseline (2010) trade data
supplied by both NEA and MSI as well as the individual countries that
comprise the regional groupings used in both datasets, container trade
across the NEA corridors is mapped to trade across the regional
groupings used elsewhere, which is retained for future trade. See
Section E of the appendices.
2.4. Mapping commodities to ship types
A final step assigns commodities to ship types, preventing the ex-
istence of excess trade which is constrained by the global fleet avail-
ability and capacity in each time step. By doing so (e.g. using baseline
trade data to remove the containerised portion of each projected
commodity) we also ensure that double counting of future trade be-
tween the methods described in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 is prevented.
Collating the results from the three methods of projecting trade
flows, we obtain a matrix of quantities traded between regions, for
specific commodities expressed either at the ISIC or NST/R levels (cf.
Section B of the Appendix). For validation and with a view to providing
insight of greatest relevance to the shipping sector, trade in each
commodity is also expressed in the 3 main ship types - dry bulk, wet
bulk, and containers, such that the total weight per ship type in 2010 is
consistent with the ship specific totals reported for year 2010 in Ref.
[35].
In this way, we confirm whether the calculated 2010 quantity
transported for each ship type, is neither over nor under-estimated re-
lative to the actual quantity transported per ship type. The evolution of
transport demand per ship type allows for comparison with other
works, as further discussed in Section 3.5.
3. Results and discussion
The projection of shipping demand reflects efforts to mitigate
emissions as well as varying degrees of adaptation and responses to
climate impacts. The effects of climate change will manifest directly in
the emergence of new patterns of commodity trades or more indirectly
in the distribution of centres of production. Different commodities will
embody specific responses to these pressures, whilst also by necessity,
reflecting a response to distinct consumptive demand. Table 1 sum-
marises some of the most visible processes whereby the diverse effects
of climate change ultimately manifest in significant changes in output
and trade for specific commodities. Table D6 in the appendices provides
additional information by commodity. These points will be discussed in
the following sections.
The remainder of the section presents the four trade scenarios. First,
growth in total maritime trade is discussed and compared with the
9 Unless specifically stated otherwise, this paper analyses commodities using
the ISIC classification to facilitate the exposition of results. The conversion from
HS into ISIC takes place using the intermediate step of converting to the NST/R
classification. This operation ensures that UN Comtrade data is commonly ex-
pressed in these taxonomies and no information is lost in the process.
Supporting documentation for the match is available at the index of
Correspondence tables, RAMON, Eurostat, and Muendler, M.-A [48]. ‘Converter
from SITC to ISIC’, University of California-San Diego, unpublished mimeo.
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extant literature. Next, results are analysed for each of the broad ca-
tegory commodities: energy commodities, containers, and non-energy
bulk. Aggregate results are compared against the extant literature.
Finally, future trade in biomass, agricultural produce, and iron ore is
discussed in more detail, as salient examples of how different climate
change mitigation, adaptation, and impacts may affect trade in specific
commodities, at the regional level.
3.1. Future development of world trade
Fig. 2 shows world trade, in terms of tonnes loaded, as the sum of
the three modes of maritime transport – container, dry, and wet – where
each panel represents one of the four scenarios. All scenarios show
continuous and substantial growth for world trade. However, rates of
growth vary between scenarios.
Trade in 2050 in the GR scenario is twice that in 2010.
Characterised by low material intensity, the GR scenario foresees
growth slowing down for containerised trade and, similarly, for wet
bulk trade, which decreases over the decade 2040–2050. Spurred by
trade in bioenergy commodities, growth in the dry bulk sector increases
over the entire period 2010–2050.
The HR scenario exhibits the highest rates of growth in total trade,
which quadruples over the period 2010–2050. This is the outcome of
unfettered growth in demand for oil and gas, ore, and coal, with no step
changes in the generation mix. In 2050, the container and dry bulk
fleets carry approximately 33% more tonnage relative to the GR sce-
nario – but with a very different mix of dry bulk commodities (cf.
Section 3.2). Wet bulk trade also quadruples in HR, resulting in twice
the respective level seen in GR in 2050. Among the scenarios, HR ex-
periences the highest growth in GDP. In addition, the absence of strong
climate mitigation allows expansion of material intensive industries
such as vehicle manufacturing, with associated growth in related sec-
tors like mining and steel production.
Finally, the two MR scenarios exhibit modest growth rates leading
to just below (MR2C) or above (MR4C) double the 2010 amount in
2050. In terms of total trade, MR2C follows a similar trajectory as
MR4C until 2030. From 2030 onwards, however, the different climate
change futures represented by MR2C and MR4C, respectively, are re-
flected in differing rates of growth in world trade. In the latter, the total
quantity of production follows an approximately linear trend out to
2050.
An additional consideration is the impact of changes of trade on the
composition of the fleet and therefore is of interest to ship-owners as
well as producers and consumers. Especially given the long-life cycle of
maritime vessels and the time lag between market signal and eventual
vessel deployment. This is relevant to commodities which grow quickly
Fig. 2. World sea trade according to the four scenarios.
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beyond a certain point in time (such as biomass in HR) or decline after a
period of growth (as seen for crude oil in MR2C). Another consideration
(beyond the scope of this work) is the potential emergence of novel
trades such as bulk transport of potable water.
3.2. Trade in energy commodities
The highest trade in energy commodities is projected in HR, fol-
lowed by the GR scenario and with MR4C projecting greater growth
than MR2C (See Fig. 3). Trade in biomass is significant in the GR sce-
nario increasing from 12Mt to over 4 Gt by 2050, associated with near
total uptake of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)
within the electricity sector, underpinned by output from those regions
with greatest capacity for land expansion, Africa and South America
foremost.
In contrast, the HR scenario sees no major step changes in the en-
ergy sector, with continued use of coal for electricity generation. By
2050 the quantity of electricity generated increases threefold, with
approximately half of the total generated through coal combustion.
Consequently, the quantity of coal traded between 2010 and 2050 in-
creases fourfold.
In comparison to other scenarios MR2C demonstrates a much more
modest (+30%) increase in the trade of energy commodities. Whilst
there are similarities to the GR scenario (coal is displaced in the elec-
tricity generation mix), a lower increase in traded biomass is observed
as BECCS is not as prominent (cf. Table C.6 in the Appendices). In
Fig. 3. Global trade in energy commodities in the four scenarios.
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contrast, this scenario projects large growth in nuclear energy which by
2050 contributes approximately 50% of the electricity generation mix,
following growth in Chinese, US, and Western European nuclear ca-
pacity. MR4C shares commonalities with the HR scenario, with an in-
crease in coal, both with and without CCS. A 147% increase in coal
trade is mainly attributable to a growth in absolute electricity demand
rather than growth in the proportion of coal in the generation mix.
All scenarios project an increase in refined oil trade by 2050; this
increase is most pronounced for HR, whereby the quantity of refined oil
shipped grows six-fold by 2050. This is attributable to a proportional
increase in road vehicle kilometres associated with economic growth
particularly in regions including China and other developed Asia, where
the refined energy demands of the car and commercial vehicle sector
increases ten-fold by 2050. This rise is only facilitated under a strict
carbon budget if net negative emissions through BECCS materialise at a
large scale. Similar pressures manifest in the Middle Road scenarios but
in MR2C increased electrification of transport contributes to a con-
tinued reduction in crude oil trade and a peak in refined oil trade in
2040, sufficient to reduce total energy trade after 2035. However, in
absolute terms, an increase in refined petroleum trade is observed due
to concentration of demand in regions which do not exhibit a com-
mensurate increase in domestic production. Specifically, by 2050 China
accounts for 67% of road diesel and gasoline demand and 62% of re-
fined oil imports. This is in contrast to decarbonisation of the Chinese
(and global) electricity sector, reinforcing that for large economies,
decarbonising distinct sectors at different rates can affect patterns of
global trade. It is this nexus of locational and technological elements
which reinforces that decarbonisation may not necessarily manifest a
reduction in trade. Indeed, all scenarios project increased trade of liquid
LNG. What drives this growth is different in each scenario with the HR
scenario projecting increased demand due to growing electricity con-
sumption along with increased export capacity in the Middle East and
Russia. The GR scenario foresees growth in its use in the transport
sector, specifically the light commercial vehicle sector.
3.2.1. Biomass trade
Holding the global temperature increase to below 2 °C requires
drastic cuts to greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn implies funda-
mental changes to the global consumption of energy commodities. By
weight, energy commodities make up about 40% of world seaborne
trade [5].
The role of bioenergy is one of the most salient differences between the
2 °C and 4 °C scenarios, and in between the two 2 °C scenarios. In the
climate change literature, most scenarios characterised by successful cli-
mate change mitigation rely heavily on the deployment of BECCS at ex-
tremely ambitious rates [31,36]. In GR, BECCS constitutes 42% of global
electricity generation, comparable to total electricity generation in 2010. It
is this very high, arguably implausible amount of BECCS assumed in many
integrated assessment modelling studies, that allows continued growth in
other energy commodities, such as refined oil products for transport. As
such, this raises important questions regarding underpinning assumptions
within integrated assessment models.
The availability of land suitable for the production of bioenergy
commodities is one (of many) crucial criteria that will determine the
role bioenergy can play in decarbonising the world's energy supply. In
the scenarios presented here, it is also the key parameter differentiating
the role of bioenergy between GR and MR2C, the two climate change
mitigation scenarios (cf. Section 2.2). Similar to coal, and oil, there is a
distinct geography of bioenergy production and trade, with the latter
illustrated in Fig. 4.
In GR, biomass exports are dominated by Africa, and Central and
South America. In the MR2C scenario, Africa is also the top exporter,
with the remainder more evenly distributed among the other regions.
More importantly, total African exports in GR are five times higher than
in MR2C, by 2050. In HR and MR4C, bioenergy plays only a minor role,
by comparison.
In summary, within just a few decades, the climate change mitiga-
tion scenarios foresee a trade in bioenergy commodities springing up
and reaching one to five billion tonnes by 2050. For the shipping sector,
this increase holds a sizable opportunity, albeit an uncertain one given
the wide range across the scenarios and unproven scalability of this
technology.
3.3. Trade in containerised non-energy commodities
Container trade is found to grow across all four scenarios (See
Fig. 5). At an aggregated level GR demonstrates relative decoupling of
GDP with growth by 2040, due to a reduction in material intensity,
through circular economy principles. With regionalisation a key ele-
ment of the GR scenario, trade in highly manufactured goods between
Asia and Europe, and on other established trade routes stagnates as
markets mature by 2030. Most of the growth takes place in intra-re-
gional trade.
In contrast, container trade in the HR scenario grows at rates
comparable to GDP growth. This reflects growth across both developing
and developed markets, as GDP remains materially intensive amid a
globalised economy. Within this context, one of the most important
drivers is convergence of economies between consumers and producers
with back-haul across mainline trades (i.e. the return leg from export
markets) increasing rapidly to reach parity in absolute terms by 2050.
In that regard no one region dominates growth in trade.
Both MR scenarios are placed in the middle ground between the GR
and HR scenarios, in a world with barriers to trade in place. In these
scenarios trade along many emergent routes continues to grow but le-
vels off by the 2040s. At this stage, interregional trade remains static
but remains a significant contributor by 2050. The main distinguishing
element between both scenarios is the point at which growth in es-
tablished mainline trade levels off, prior to 2040 in MR2C, post 2040 in
MR4C.
3.4. Trade in non-containerised, non-energy commodities
Non-energy commodities carried in bulk show comparable growth
rates until 2020 and diverge afterwards. The growth rates of maritime
trade for each scenario follow directly from the mean growth rates of
production of non-containerised, non-energy goods.
The HR scenario sees a growth factor of 3.5 between 2010 and 2050
which is positively correlated with GDP growing by a factor of about 4.
This pronounced trade growth originates from increased demand. The
MR4C scenario experiences near-linear growth, doubling between 2010
and 2050. The GR scenario experiences the same growth as MR4C until
2030, then growth slows and, from 2040, trade decreases, mainly due
to the decline of iron ore production and exports from Central and
South America, and Australia.
The MR2C scenarios grow continuously, but slowly, with trade in
non-energy, non-containerised cargoes just above the GR scenario in
2050.
3.4.1. Trade in agricultural commodities (excluding biomass)
Trade is projected based on the agricultural production through
modifications to regional trends in land use/availability, yield and re-
lationship between crop and livestock output, such that global demand,
aggregated from regional per capita demand is satisfied.10 Non-energy
agricultural commodities, mainly food and animal feed, will be affected
by climate change impacts, most directly through impacts on growing
conditions and other socio-economic drivers. Within the suite of sce-
narios, GR faces the fewest climate change impacts, and the lowest
population growth (cf. Section C of Appendix). Besides population
growth, the per capita demand for grain and other food commodities is
10 See Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix.
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a key driver, and a main parameter for this driver is meat consumption.
Since the latter is also comparatively low in GR, this is the scenario with
the lowest levels of trade in food commodities.
The MR scenarios face difficulties in adaptation (cf. Section C of the
Appendix), as well as the highest growth in population. In MR2C, re-
gions with large land availability that will benefit from higher tem-
peratures11 increase their production and exports, with a corresponding
growth in world trade. In comparison to MR2C, the MR4C scenario,
faces far more severe impacts on agricultural production seeing lower
global production and lower trade (with the latter declining in absolute
terms between 2040 and 2050).
Finally, HR is characterised by successful adaptation measures and
although population grows more slowly than in the MR scenarios there is
higher meat consumption. Taken together, this leads to the highest levels
of both production and trade, although the extent to which effective
adaptation can be maintained beyond the temporal setting of this exercise.
3.4.2. Iron ore trade
Iron ore trade has significant variation across the range of scenarios.
Beside the underlying demand for steel there are two main drivers. The
first is the underlying assumption on the share of steel recycled in electric
arc furnaces, demonstrating a linkage between decarbonisation and trade
of non-energy commodities (i.e. iron ore). As a consequence, ore
production by mid-century increases in the 4 °C scenarios, by 77% com-
pared to the 2010 baseline in HR, and by 30% in MR4C; conversely, in the
2 °C scenarios production reduces, by 34% in MR2C, and by 41% in GR.
The second is the geographical pattern of production and, in turn,
trade: relatively few countries or regions dominate the production of
iron ore – Australia, Central and South America, and China foremost.
Iron ore mining in China expanded rapidly during the first decade of the
21st century [37]. Further expansion, coupled with slowing demand
growth, could squeeze other producers, and it might also bring China
close to depleting its resources, as seen in HR, leading to drastic swings
in the global pattern of trade. In contrast, the pattern of iron ore trade
evolves more smoothly in the other scenarios, with one exception: the
appearance of Africa as a major exporter by 2050. Although the in-
herent uncertainty associated with all scenario exercises bears re-
minding, indeed the recent imposition by the US administration of
tariffs on steel and aluminium imports, has been viewed by key ex-
porting nations as adding further instability to the market [38].
3.5. Comparison with the literature
Fig. 6 portrays the evolution of the projected trade flows according
to the four scenarios vis-à-vis historical trade flows expressed in mil-
lions of tonnes loaded. Historical flows come from UNCTAD [35] 12 and
Fig. 4. Trade in category wood and cork, which includes bioenergy commodities in scenarios GR (left) and MR2C (right).
Fig. 5. Global container trade (left) and trade in non-containerised, non-energy commodities (right) in the four different scenarios, presented beside GDP (in 2005
intl. USD) in the underlying SSP scenarios.
11 With Russia the stand-out example, although there is uncertainty on the
suitability of land for cultivation in the areas that will likely improve under
climate change.
12 Historical totals are the aggregates of the categories: “main bulks”, “other
dry cargo”, “containers” and “oil and gas” according to the classification of
UNCTAD [35]; p. 5).
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span 1970–2015 while the projected totals are aggregated across the
three ship types considered in our scenarios and cover the 2010–2050
period. During the transition period 2010–2020 no marked deviation
between realised volumes of trade flows with the projected volumes
under the scenarios are observed. Growth rates of the three scenarios
approximately average 21% (GR), 39% (HR), 16% (MR2C), 24%
(MR4C) per decade. Of the four scenarios only the HR case produces a
growth rate comparable to historical growth rates. These ranged from
approximately 40%–50% per decade with the exception of the 1980's
slowdown. Growth rates in the HR scenarios are about the same for all
three cargo types considered, containers, wet, and dry, leading to a less
conservative projection, which is, however, placed at the lower bound
of the extant literature.
Fig. 7 illustrates this by comparing the scenarios with selected re-
ferences from the literature (cf. Section 1.1), for world container trade
in tonnes loaded. This commodity is chosen as it has in previous dec-
ades demonstrated periods of high trade growth, therefore projections
of total trade are sensitive to assumptions on how the global container
market will evolve in the future. As the Third IMO GHG Study [8] and
its update [39] only project transport work, in tonne-miles, this is used
as a proxy for trade in tonnes loaded, to allow comparison with this
study. Historical data indicate this assumption is reasonable [5].
A striking result of this scenario exercise is that the plausible range
of the volume of future trade in 2030 and 2050 is lower than the sce-
narios in the Third IMO GHG Study [8], and its update [39]. This result
is an illustration of focusing on granularity, which aims to address
complexity and is much more strongly driven by climate mitigation
coupled with impacts, than others that have gone before. For instance,
the Third IMO GHG Study uses future GDP (according to the SSP sce-
narios) as an indicator variable for container trade, fitting a curve to
historical data (cf. Sections 1.1 and E of the Appendix). That the dif-
ference in methodologies produces such distinctive results is in itself
instructive, in terms of the implied deviation in the rates of change and
the absolute levels of trade from more recent trends. Furthermore, the
update of the scenarios in the original IMO study brings the projections
closer towards the scenarios of this study, reflecting a more challenging
economic environment whereby the processes that drive globalisation,
such as industrial expansion in emerging regions is seen to peak amid
eventual saturation of consumer demand. Similarly, more recent in-
dustry outlooks have aligned with lower projections, as exemplified by
Ref. [23]. While other lines of evidence [40,41] also support lower
growth expectations whereby the drivers for globalisation do not per-
sist, we re-emphasise that the scenarios do not constitute forecasts but
rather explore plausible future developments under climate constraints.
In the Third IMO GHG Study, both coal and oil trade reduce
significantly under the RCP 2.6 scenario. Due to differing assumptions
on negative emissions technologies, as well as the availability and cost
of the variety of energy sources in the underlying integrated assessment
models, this stands in contrast with both the GR and MR2C scenarios.
Both foresee a near-total drop in coal trade by mid-21st century while
reliance on oil is far more persistent, with trade in crude and fuel de-
rivatives peaking in 2030. Trade in bio-energy (cf. Section 3.2.1) shows
the biggest variation across the scenarios, highlighting a potentially
crucial element of the world's future energy mix and, by implication,
the future basket of shipped commodities, which is omitted altogether
in the IMO Studies. Beyond total headline numbers, the suite of sce-
narios covers a level of detail, in terms of commodities and geo-
graphical resolution, which goes beyond the existing literature.
3.6. Uncertainty
All scenarios and models entail an inherent degree of uncertainty,
given their projective rather than predictive role. Refsgaard et al. [42]
distinguish between lacking awareness of imperfect knowledge and
possessing awareness of the limits the reliably of knowledge. Studies
such as Walker et al. [43] categorise different sources of uncertainty
depending on where they manifest within the scenarios/modelling
process, such as input or framing uncertainty. Particularly given the
presence of different methods and components, it is difficult to un-
equivocally state whether a scenario projection is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’,
however individual elements may be deemed as representing unfeasible
versions of the future. Whilst uncertainty is unavoidable, the scenario
process described in this study incorporated a number of steps to mi-
tigate risks, including both internal processes, validation against ex-
isting datasets and review/interaction with stakeholders. Table 2
summarises the most important steps to mitigate the model/scenario
risks identified by Walker et al. [43].
Fig. 6. Comparison of trade projection volumes with historical volumes.
Fig. 7. Comparison of container trade projections with the literature.
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4. Conclusions
We present a suite of world maritime trade scenarios using a novel
disaggregated, commodity specific interdisciplinary methodology
which contributes to the futures literature. The scenarios explore the
possibility space for how climate change mitigation, adaptation and
impacts, along with different socio-economic framings, may drive and
influence international maritime trade. Scoping future maritime trade is
essential for appreciating the scale and extent of technical and opera-
tional change required across the shipping sector, to mitigate emissions
in line with international agreements. This is equally relevant to inform
ship-owners, whose choices (in the form of vessel builds) will ultimately
have a functional life measured in decades.
The scenarios illustrate higher amounts of world maritime trade in a
4 °C future than in a 2 °C future. However, they also show that trade can
evolve very differently, even in worlds with similar amounts of climate
change. Overall, future trade in fossil fuels will necessarily be lower in a
world with more emphasis on climate change mitigation. However,
other assumptions relating to wider energy system change also alter the
amounts and patterns of trade of particular energy-related commod-
ities: Coal trade is significantly reduced in a 2 °C world compared to a
4 °C world, but trade in refined oil products depends in these scenarios
on the electrification of transport. Trade in oil is also significantly in-
fluenced by the amount of BECCS deployment assumed within energy
system scenarios by 2050. Furthermore, extensive BECCS deployment
will drive production and potential trade of biomass, which could offer
a significant opportunity but also a risk, for the shipping sector.
Trade in non-energy commodities, both containerised and non-
containerised is higher in the 4 °C scenarios compared to 2 °C.
Nevertheless, projections for containerised trade are a cautionary re-
minder to the sector that it cannot assume previously observed levels of
growth persist, which is perhaps at odds with elements of some studies
[39]. An analogous caveat also manifests in Constantinescu et al. [40];
suggesting that markets for goods may saturate, mature further or shift
to new, less globalised, business models, particularly in more estab-
lished markets, with a corresponding impact on trade. It is evident from
the scenarios presented that the shipping sector must become resilient
and agile to respond to a range of possible futures. Such futures may
entail the emergence of new, or contraction of established, markets,
such as biomass and coal; and also changing centres of demand, as
observed in containerised trade. Furthermore, stakeholders in this
sector would be wise to note that the extent and timing of CO2 miti-
gation in shipping depends on the level of trade and transport work.
Even scenarios with 4 °C of warming in future require the sector to
make efforts to decarbonise, and whether 2 °C or 4 °C is aimed for, this
challenge becomes greater as absolute volumes of trade increase.
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Table 2
Summary of measures to mitigate uncertainty within the scenario process, adapted from Walker et al. [43].
Error Type Description Comment on uncertainty mitigation activities
Context and framing Appropriate boundaries and agreed description of the
system.
Scenario framing is influenced heavily by SSPs which have been widely applied with
narratives developed in conjunction with stakeholders. Choice of geographic and temporal
boundaries (regional groups as opposed to countries and ending projections at 2050) due
to the difficulty in accurately reflecting individual countries across multiple commodities,
particularly the scale of climate impact by 2100. Energy system model encompasses all
major economic sectors.
Input uncertainty Uncertainty related to external driving forces or
dependent variables that influence model outcomes.
Economic and population projections are taken from SSPs. Baseline (2010) trade data
provided by NEA and MSI and validated against UNCTAD data. Production inputs based on
official datasets (such as UNIDO, FAO, World bank etc.) See point below on regional
production models. Energy system model inputs are taken from external sources (e.g. SSP
GDP estimates), and reflect fundamental constraints (e.g. Bio-mass availably) which are
influenced by both literature sources and both internal and external review.
Model structure uncertainty Simplified descriptions of modelled processes. The choice of three methods to model the global trade system reflects its inherent
complexity. Econometric models are compared with existing studies on the relationship
between trade and output. Where a statistical relationship between regional output and
trade is not available, projection is based on the econometric relationship between trade
and GDP and SSP GDP projections. Commodity specific production models (which serve as
inputs to the econometric projection) are simplified representations, entailing a source of
uncertainty. This allows fundamental constraints i.e. regional limits to production to be
readily and explicitly reflected and linked across related commodities. The levels of growth
in commodity trade by 2020 are compared against estimates for 2015 ensure a sudden
unrealistic change in the economic system is not reflected.
Parameter uncertainty Uncertainty in the variables associated with models. All variables used in the quantification and projection of production are taken from
literature sources or established datasets. For all such commodities and regions the
production model outputs are validated against baseline (2010) data, whilst future
projections reviewed in the context of historic levels of growth. The energy system model
has been applied extensively including within the IPCC scenario database.
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Appendix
A. 16 study regions
Within our scenarios global trade is explored across 230 countries categorised into 16 regions (cf. Table 3 and Fig. 8. A map with the 16 regions
colour-coded.), and is grouped in terms of carriage by 3 main vessel types: dry bulk, wet bulk and containers.
Table 3
Broad Commodity Categories.
Region
Africa
Australia
Canada
Central and South America
China
Eastern Europe
Former Soviet Union
India
Japan
Mexico
Middle East
Other Developing Asia
South Korea
UK
USA
Western Europe
Fig. 8. A map with the 16 regions colour-coded.
B. Commodity groups
The trade scenarios cover nearly all traded commodities, which are expressed either at the ISIC classification as 31 aggregated categories, or the
NST/R commodity classification as 52 aggregated categories. By way of example the commodity classification NST/R is expanded in Tables 4 and 5
while the ISIC classification is presented in 4.
Table 4
ISIC Classification for traded and produced commodities; the column on the right indicates the type of the commodity, with respect to the trade projection method
(cf. Section 2).
ISIC ISIC Title Type of commodity/projection method
01,02 Agriculture and Forestry Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 18% (cf. Section 2.4)
Bioenergy from TIAM
05 Fishing Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 21% (cf. Section 2.4)
10,11 Coal, Lignite, Crude oil, Natural Gas Energy commodities
12 Mining of Uranium Excluded (as negligible in absolute terms)
13,14 Ores, Mining and Quarrying Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 10% (cf. Section 2.4)
15–19 Food and Textiles Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 37% (cf. Section 2.4)
20–22 Wood and Paper Manufacturing Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 31% (cf. Section 2.4)
Bioenergy from TIAM
23–26 Chemicals, rubber, refined fuels, coke, non-metallic minerals Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 18% (cf. Section 2.4)
27–29 Basic and Fabricated Metal Commodities Non-energy, non-containerised commodity; containerised share of 24% (cf. Section 2.4)
30–33 Manufactured Electronic Equipment Container commodity.
34–35 Manufacture of Motor and other Vehicles Container commodity.
36–37 Other Manufacturing Container commodity.
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Table 5
NST/R Classification for traded and produced commodities
NST/R Code NST/R Description NST/R Code NST/R Description
0 Live animals 52 Semi-finished rolled steel products
1 Cereals (including cereals used for animal feed) 53 Bars, sections, wire rod, railway and tramway track construction material of iron or steel
2 Potatoes 54 Steel sheets, plates, hoop and strip
3 Other fresh or frozen fruit and vegetable 55 Tubes, pipes, iron and steel castings and forgings
4 Textile materials and man-made fibres 56 Non-ferrous metals
5 Wood and cork 61 Sand, gravel, clay and slag
6 Sugar beet 62 Salt, iron pyrites, sulphur
9 Other raw animal and vegetable material 63 Other stone earths and minerals
11 Sugars 64 Cement, lime
12 Beverages 65 Plasters
13 Stimulants and spices 69 Other manufactured building materials
14 Perishable foodstuffs 71 Natural fertilizers
16 Other non-perishable foodstuffs and hops 72 Chemical fertilizers
17 Animal food and foodstuff waste 81 Basic chemicals
18 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit and fats 82 Aluminium oxide and hydroxide
21 Coal 83 Coal chemicals
22 Lignite and peat 84 Paper pulp and waste paper
23 Coke 89 Other chemical products
31 Crude petroleum 91 Transport equipment
32 Fuel derivatives 92 Tractors, agricultural machinery and equipment
33 Gaseous hydrocarbons, liquid or compressed 93 Other machinery, apparatus and appliances, engines, parts thereof
34 Non-fuel derivatives 94 Manufactures of metal
41 Iron ore 95 Glass, glassware, ceramic products
45 Non-ferrous ores and waste 96 Leather, textiles and clothing
46 Iron and steel waste and blast furnace dust 97 Other manufactured articles
51 Pig iron and crude steel; ferro-alloys 99 Miscellaneous articles
C. Scenario narrative elements and inputs to TIAM-UCL
The projections of trade and output are framed by both qualitative and quantitative characteristics. These contextualise the system in which trade
occurs and determine trade in specific commodities.
Table 6
Underpinning scenario characteristics.
Scenario name Green Road Middle Road 2C Middle Road 4C High Road
Temperature
framing*
2 °C 2 °C 4 °C 4 °C
RCP* 2.6 2.6 8.5 8.5
SSP* 1 2 2 5
Economic
growth*
GDP from SSP1 GDP from SSP2 GDP from SSP2 GDP from SSP5
Adaptation
capacity
High High Low Low
Final energy
demand**
Based on SSP1; adjusted to reflect scenario narra-
tive; ∼546 EJ in 2050
Based on SSP2 Based on SSP2 Based on SSP5
Biomass
availability
350 EJ/y 130 EJ/y 130 EJ/y 38 EJ/y
Material
intensity*
Low Moderate to high Moderate to high High
Energy Intensity Low Varied amongst regions Varied amongst regions High
Population
growth*
SSP1 SSP2 SSP2 SSP5
CCS availability* High (max. rate of capacity growth 15%/y) Moderate (max. rate of capacity
growth 10%/y)
Moderate (max. rate of capacity
growth 10%/y)
Low (max. rate of capacity
growth 5%/y)
Trade barriers* Low Moderate Moderate Low
Note: Elements marked with an asterisk * are also input to the Integrated Assessment Model TIAM-UCL. Final energy demand, marked with two asterisks **, is an
output from TIAM-UCL, mainly based on GDP and population from the SSP. In the case of SSP1 this has been adjusted to reflect the energy efficiency scenario
narrative.
D. Projection methods and sources of uncertainty
For each commodity the historical estimate of production is expressed in units that form a basis for future projection. Table 7 summarises the
units, data sources, methodological basic for projection of future production, as well as the means by which climate sensitivities are manifest in each
commodity. Crucially wherever possible fundamental linkages between commodities are represented, in some cases this requires individual
C. Walsh, et al. Marine Policy 106 (2019) 103537
14
commodities to be grouped (such as non-energy wood and manufactured wood which is a component of ISIC 2 below which is linked to an
aggregated category which includes manufactured wood and paper).
Table 7
Summary of methods for deriving future production estimates by commodity group (references in footnote).
ISIC no. & name Unit Means of projection Climate sensitivities Bounding
data
01
Agriculture
Mt net aggregate production in crop and
livestock products. (Based on FAO datasets).
[1]
Assumptions on land availability and baseline
productivity. Informed by population projections.
[16]
Reduction in availability and productivity of
land due to climate change impacts and
levels of adaptation.
Population
(SSP) tem-
perature in-
crease (RCP)
02
Forestry and
Logging
Mt production of raw wood equivalent.
(Based on FAO datasets). [2]
Assumptions on land use and baseline produc-
tivity [12]. Projections based on ratio between
harvest and growth at regional scale [13].
Initial projections on fuel wood production
replaced by solid bioenergy from TIAM.
temperature
increase
(RCP)
05
Fishing, op-
eration of fish
hatcheries an-
d fish farms
Mt production of whole fish equivalent.
(Based on FAO datasets). [3]
Assumptions on change in global per capita
consumption and global distribution of produc-
tion centres [14].
Identification of current areas of (near-)
depleted stocks and regions at risk from
climate change. (Based on FAO datasets).
Population
(SSP) tem-
perature in-
crease (RCP)
13
Metal ores
Mt Iron Ore
(Based on World Steel [4] and U.S. [5] and
British Geological Survey [6], mineral com-
modity summaries for iron ore).
Steel production by technology inferred from
TIAM sectoral energy demands. Translated into
demand based on technology pathways and re-
serves.
Future energy consumption by steel sector
taken from TIAM, based on SSP and RCP
framing.
GDP (SSP)
temperature
increase
(RCP)
14
Other mining
Mt production. Based on UN production
survey statistics [7].
Trends in the regional production intensity of
GDP
None GDP (SSP)
15
Food manu-
facture
Mt production. Based on UN production
survey statistics [7].
Based on historic ratio between regional output
of ISIC 01 [1-2] and ISIC15.
As for ISIC 01 As for ISIC 01
17–19
Textiles, clot-
hes, and fab-
rics
Mt production. Based on UN production
survey statistics [7].
Due to data issues production is projected at the
global level based on historic trends and popula-
tion growth.
None. Population
(SSP)
20–22
Paper, and w-
ood manufac-
ture
Mt production. Based on FAO production
statistics [7].
Based on historic ratio between regional output
of ISIC 02, and aggregate output of ISIC 20-22.
As for ISIC 02 As for ISIC 02
24
Chemicals, a-
nd chemical
products
Mt production. Based on total global pro-
duction taken from the American Chemical
Council (AAC) [8] and disaggregated based
on regional output in USD [9].
Based on projections of sectoral energy demand
(TIAM), and average energy intensity of chemi-
cals [15]. Allocated to regions based on narrative.
Assumptions on future trends in energy in-
tensity based on likely demand for energy
intensive chemicals such as fertilisers, based
on climate adaptation narrative.
GDP (SSP)
temperature
increase
(RCP).
25
Plastics, and
plastic pro-
ducts
Mt production. Based global production
from Plastics Europe (assoc. of plastic man-
ufacturers) [10], disaggregated based on
regional output in USD.
Based on historic trends in production and in-
dustrial energy use. Allocated to regions based on
narrative.
Future energy consumption by industrial
sector taken from TIAM.
GDP (SSP)
temperature
increase
(RCP).
26
Other non-m-
etallic mineral
products
Mt Cement (proxy). US Geological Survey,
mineral commodity summaries for cement
[11].
Based on historic trends in proportion of CO2
emissions from cement production. Projected
based on future emissions (TIAM), share from
cement, and carbon intensity. Regional
Allocation based on narrative.
Future CO2 emissions from TIAM GDP (SSP)
temperature
increase
(RCP)
27
Basic metals
Mt production. Based on data taken from
world steel [4].
Based on historic ratio between regional output
of ISIC 27 and steel production (taken from ISIC
13).
As for ISIC 13. As for ISIC
13.
28-29 Manufactu-
re of fabri-
cated metal
products and
machinery
Value for ISIC 27 used as proxy for these two
categories.
As for ISIC 27. As for ISIC 27. As for ISIC
27.
30–36 Included in separate container trade projec-
tions. No production estimates.
– – -a
a [1] FAO (2017a) Primary crop and livestock food balance and land use statistics. Food and Agriculture. Statistical databases. Food and Agriculture Organisation
of the United Nations. [2] FAO (2017b) Forestry products production and land use Statistics. Food and Agriculture. Statistical databases. Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations. [3] FAO (2017c) Aquaculture and live catch Statistics. Food and Agriculture. Aquastat Statistical databases. Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations. [4] World Steel Association, (1980–2015). World Steel Statistical year books. World Steel Association, Brussels. [5] United States
Geological United States Geological Statistics (2014a) Mineral Statistics for Iron Ore. United States Geological Survey. [6] British Geological Survey (2011–2015)
World Mineral Statistics. [7] United Nations Industrial Statistics (2014) Dataset of Industrial Commodity Statistics. United Nations Statistics Division [8] American
Chemical Council (2016) Statistics bulletin. Washington, DC [9] United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (2014b) Dataset of Industrial Output (INDSTAT
2). United Nations Statistics Division [10] Plastics Europe Plastics Europe (2012) Global production statistics. Quarterly report. [11] United States Geological
Statistics (2014b) Statistics for Cement Production. United States Geological Survey. [12] Raunikar, R., Buongiorno, J., Turner, J.A. and Zhu, S., (2010) Global
outlook for wood and forests with the bioenergy demand implied by scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Forest Policy and Economics,
12(1), pp.48-56. [13] Keenan, R.J., Reams, G.A., Achard, F., de Freitas, J.V., Grainger, A. and Lindquist, E., (2015) Dynamics of global forest area: results from the
FAO global forest resources assessment 2015. Forest Ecology and Management, 352, pp.9-20. [14] Cochrane, K., De Young, C., Soto, D. and Bahri, T., (2009) Climate
change implications for fisheries and aquaculture. FAO Fisheries and aquaculture technical paper, 530, p.212. [15] Saygın, D. and Patel, M.K., (2009). Chemical and
Petro-chemical Sector. Potential of best practice technology and other measures for improving energy efficiency. International Energy Agency Information paper.
[16] Lobell, D. B., and Gourdji, S. M. (2012). The influence of climate change on global crop productivity. Plant Physiology, 160(4), 1686-1697.
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E. Summary overview of selected literature sources
By way of comparison, the results of a number of scenarios in the literature are summarised in Table 8, which presents the types of commodities
included, the presence of a climate framing, and projected trade (either in terms of tonnage or transport work), expressed as multiples of baseline
trade in 2010.
Table 8
Overview of selected trade scenarios from the literature
Scenario Commodity and Region Main Basis for Projection and Climate Framing Time frame and results
Smith et al.
[8]
Wet (oil), dry (coal and other), and unitised. Global. RCPs and SSPs; resource production/consumption and GDP as
indicator variables.
Projections to 2050. Transport work,
relative to 2010 level:
Unitised ∼5.8–14.5
Wet bulk ∼0.8–2.0
Dry bulk ∼2.8–6.7
Lee [39] Wet (oil), dry (coal and other), gas, unitised (container
and other), and chemicals.
Update of [8] - same methodology, updated data. Projections to 2050. Transport work,
relative to 2010 level:
Unitised ∼3.3–8.3
Wet bulk ∼0.7–2.3
Dry bulk ∼3.7–9.4
Fontagne and
Foure
[17]
Projections of volume of trade in goods aggregated to
developing and developed nations, and global.
Trade elasticity with income, no explicit climate framing. Projections to 2035. 1.3–4.3-fold in-
crease in trade by 2035, expressed in
average annual growth rate.
Château et al.
[18]
As with Fontagné and Fouré [17]. As with Fontagné and Fouré [17]. Projection to 2060. 4-fold increase in
trade by 2060, expressed in average
annual growth rate.
Martinez et al.
[21]
20 separate commodities and 12 regions but results
presented in global aggregate and by corridor.
Trade projected based on commodity specific centres of pro-
duction and consumption and weight to value ratio and modal
share of each commodity. Trends in carbon intensity of trans-
port work.
Projections of global transport work
from 2010 to 2050, increasing four to
five-fold.
Lloyds
Register
(2016a)
Four ship types considered: container, bulk/general cargo
carrier, crude tanker, and products tanker.
Based on SRES scenarios. Projections for trade over the period
2010 to 2030: 2.3–2.8-fold growth in
containers.
SEA [23] Global seaborne trade projections for oil, five major bulk,
containerised, minor bulk, LNG, and LPG commodities.
Methodology/source of projection data not given. Projections to 2035, with 1.9-fold in-
crease in world trade in terms of
tonnes loaded over the period 2010 to
2035.
This Study 16 regions and 36 individual commodities. Results ag-
gregated to global level from regional results. Results also
expressed in terms of Wet, Dry, and Containers type.
Varied based on commodity type, includes econometrics,
commodity specific material flow analyses, energy system
modelling, and bespoke container projection model. Explicit
RCPs manifested for different energy commodity type.
2050. 1.8–3.7 increase in transport
quantities.
E. The role of stakeholders
Within this project, a diverse array of stakeholders were consulted to support both over-arching direction specific advice on regional com-
modities, as well as review of both the scenario process and its results. In particular, stakeholders were asked ‘whether the scenarios are realistic,
sufficiently distinguishable, and appropriate for the research question?’ Additionally, some stakeholders provided a vital role in the provision of data
which is instrumental in development of scenarios themselves. The stakeholders represent a diverse group chosen based on existing professional
networks which contain individual researcher involved in this area, as well as experts approached based on their presence and expertise in maritime
research. Given this complexity it was deemed necessary to include a stakeholder cohort from a diverse array of individual specialisms.
Table 9
Summary of stakeholders
Organisation Steering Role
B9 Shipping Steering and scenario support with specific relevance to climatic mitigation and role of future markets for bio-fuels.
BAE systems Steering and scenario support
BCS Steering and scenario support
BPA Steering and scenario support
CCC Steering and scenario support with specific relevance to climatic mitigation or adaptation.
Chalmers Steering and scenario support specifically use of energy scenarios and renewable fuel.
CWR Steering and scenario support with specific relevance to climatic mitigation and the role of fleet in relation to trade.
David MacBrayne Steering and scenario support
EA Gibson Steering and scenario support
ECF Steering and scenario support
ETI Steering and scenario support
Exact Earth Provision and support in use of AIS datasets.
FFF Steering and scenario support
Fraunhofer Steering and scenario support in particular technical aspects of scenario generation.
Hawkins Wright Steering and scenario support
IEA Steering and scenario support specifically use of energy scenarios and renewable fuels.
IMO Steering and scenario support in particular potential wider regulatory elements.
(continued on next page)
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Table 9 (continued)
Organisation Steering Role
ISL Steering and scenario support
ITF Steering and scenario support
KfW Steering and scenario support
KPMG Steering and scenario support
MSI Provision of historic and baseline container trade and scenario support and review.
NEA Provision of historic and baseline trade data with a focus on inter regional flows by commodity.
RINA Steering and scenario support
Seas at risk Steering and scenario support
SSA Steering and scenario support
Svitzer Steering and scenario support
Teekay Steering and scenario support
UK Maritime Foundation Steering and scenario support
USP Steering and scenario support
WWF Steering and scenario support with specific relevance to climatic mitigation or adaptation.
Zodiac Steering and scenario support with specific relevance to quantifying future shipping demand.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103537.
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